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Abstract	
Developing	countries	face	challenges	in	using	cross-border	capital	flows	
to	fund	investments	in	sustainable	development.	International	financial	
institutions	 have	 a	 key	 role	 to	 play	 in	minimizing	 risks	 to	 developing	
economies	while	ensuring	more	efficient	allocation	of	public	and	private	
capital.	However,	 the	 global	 financial	 architecture	 is	not	 yet	 fit	 for	 the	
task.	To	advance	sustainable	financing,	we	recommend	that	the	Japanese	
G20:	(i)	agree	on	measures	 to	catalyze	and	mobilize	private	capital	 in	
support	of	the	SDGs;	(ii)	promote	measures	to	improve	the	allocation	of	
development	finance;	and	(iii)	establish,	and	encourage	commitment	to,	
funding	approaches	for	global	public	goods.	
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Challenge			
It	is	increasingly	difficult	for	developing	countries	to	use	international	capital	
flows	to	fund	investments	that	would	help	achieve	the	SDGs	without	risks	of	
capital	flow	reversals,	debt	crises	or	other	forms	of	market	instability.	
International	 financial	 institutions	 have	 a	 major	 role	 to	 play	 in	 opening	 up	
opportunities	 for	 greater	 use	 of	 cross-border	 capital	 flows	 for	 sustainable	
development,	but	their	governance	must	be	changed	to	make	them	fit	for	this	
purpose.		
The	 G20	 has	 taken	 up	 this	 agenda	 in	 a	 number	 of	 working	 groups.	 Most	
recently,	 the	 G20	 Finance	Ministers	 and	 Central	 Bank	 Governors	 formed	 an	
Eminent	Persons	Group	(EPG)	to	recommend	reforms	to	 the	global	 financial	
architecture.	This	group	has	presented	its	recommendations	which	will	now	be	
taken	forward	by	the	international	financial	architecture	Working	Group.	
The	terms	of	reference	of	the	EPG	report,	however,	were	focused.	The	overall	
challenge	at	this	stage	is	to	combine	the	recommendations	with	other	elements	
into	a	systematic	program	for	advancing	sustainable	financing.	
The	Japanese	G20	can	advance	the	agenda	in	three	ways.	
First,	it	can	agree	on	measures	to	increase	the	level	of	cross-border	capital	flows	
going	towards	sustainable	development,	and,	specifically,	on	how	to	crowd-in	
greater	volumes	of	private	finance	through	judicious	use	of	public	concessional	
and	non-concessional	finance.	
Second,	it	can	promote	measures	to	improve	the	composition	and	allocation	of	
financing	 to	maximize	development	 impact,	 by	building	a	G20	 consensus	on	
creditworthiness	analysis,	debt	transparency	and	registry,	country	platforms	
to	coordinate,	pool	and	scale	up	financing,	and	greater	use	of	risk	mitigation	
and	risk	sharing	instruments.	
Third,	it	can	agree	on	approaches	towards	burden	sharing	and	the	funding	of	
global	public	goods	to	the	benefit	of	all	countries,	including	through	innovative	
financing	mechanisms.	
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Proposal		
Despite	all	the	talk	about	moving	from	“billions	to	trillions,”	that	first	surfaced	
in	the	Addis	Ababa	Action	Agenda	(United	Nations,	2015),	the	empirical	reality	
is	that	developing	countries,	net,	do	not	use	cross-border	capital	flows	to	their	
full	extent.	Taken	as	a	group,	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	will	
have	a	zero	current	account	deficit	in	2019,	implying	that	any	capital	inflows	
they	receive	are	matched	by	an	equivalent	amount	of	capital	outflows.	
This	 pattern	more	 or	 less	 holds	 across	 all	 regions,	 although	 there	 are	 slight	
differences.	 Developing	 countries	 in	 Asia,	 where	 infrastructure	 needs	 and	
investment	rates	are	largest,	have	large	enough	domestic	savings	to	match	their	
investment	rates.	Developing	countries	in	Latin	America	do	run	small	deficits,	
on	average	(1.8%	of	GDP),	but	have	relatively	high	debt	ratios	and	debt	service	
burdens.	 Developing	 countries	 in	 sub-Saharan	 Africa	 are	 running	 current	
account	deficits	 of	 about	3.4%	of	GDP,	 but	much	of	 this	 is	 financed	 through	
concessional	funds.	
Paradoxically,	 globalization	 has	 inverted	 traditional	 economic	 views	 of	 the	
desired	direction	of	international	capital	flows.	Rather	than	encouraging	capital	
to	 flow	 to	 places	 where	 it	 is	 scarce,	 globally-mobile	 capital	 flows	 to	 places	
where	it	is	most	secure.	This	pattern	is	creating	distortions	in	the	efficiency	and	
equity	of	investment	around	the	world,	especially	of	government	investment.	
Recent	 academic	 work	 (Lowe	 et	 al.	 2018)	 presents	 new	 insights	 in	 the	
relationship	 between	 public	 and	 private	 capital	 which	 helps	 to	 better	
understand	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 public	 capital	 in	 particular.	 Public	 capital	
appears	 to	have	a	higher	 rate	of	 return	 than	private	 capital	 and,	 indeed,	 the	
return	on	private	capital	 is	higher	 in	countries	where	 the	 level	of	 the	public	
capital	 stock	 is	 higher.	 They	 are	 complements	not	 substitutes.	However,	 the	
variance	of	returns	is	also	much	higher	for	public	investment	compared	with	
private	investment.	About	half	of	all	developing	countries	seem	to	significantly	
underinvest	 in	 public	 capital	 while	 half	 overinvest	 and	 invest	 inefficiently,	
perhaps	because	of	corruption	(Knack	and	Keefer,	2007).	
It	is	time	for	the	G20	to	take	stock	of	upcoming	opportunities	to	promote	a	more	
efficient	 allocation	 of	 public	 and	 private	 capital.	 Here,	 we	 recommend	 G20	
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actions	 in	 three	 areas:	 measures	 to	 catalyze	 and	 mobilize	 private	 capital;	
measures	to	improve	the	allocation	of	development	finance;	and	measures	to	
improve	 international	 collective	 action	 in	 financing	 goods	 with	 global	
spillovers.	
Measures	to	catalyze	and	mobilize	private	capital	
The	G20	Eminent	Persons	Group	report,	welcomed	by	Leaders	in	the	Buenos	
Aires	 communique,	 has	 already	 identified	 one	 key	 challenge	 for	 the	
international	 financial	 system	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 large-scale	 asset	 class	
[principally	 for	 infrastructure]	 and	 the	 mobilization	 of	 significantly	 greater	
private	sector	participation	through	system-wide	insurance	and	diversification	
of	risk.	A	number	of	concrete	measures	are	detailed	in	the	report,	starting	with	
a	 renewed	 focus	 on	 market	 and	 creditworthiness	 fundamentals	 of	 good	
governance	and	improved	human	capital,	and	continuing	with	ideas	about	how	
to	 reorganize	 the	 instruments	 and	 work	 arrangements	 of	 the	 international	
financial	 institutions	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 work	 as	 a	 unified	 ecosystem	 (G20	
Eminent	Persons	Group	on	Global	Financial	Governance,	2018).	
Implementation	 details	 have	 been	 delegated	 to	 the	 International	 Financial	
Architecture	Working	Group.	In	addition,	the	Buenos	Aires	meeting	catalyzed	a	
number	 of	 voluntary	 commitments	 to	 give	 momentum	 to	 the	 growing	
groundswell	 to	 catalyze	private	 sustainable	 financing	 through	 reporting	 and	
information	sharing	on	sustainable	 investment	outcomes,	 that	would	 in	 turn	
permit	the	creation	of	more	sustainable	investment	vehicles	in	capital	markets	
and	in	private	equity	and	venture	capital	circles.				
G20	countries	have	 the	ability	 to	 shape	a	new	global	 social	 impact	 investing	
ecosystem.	In	a	first	ever	Investor	Forum	at	the	G20	Summit	in	Buenos	Aires	in	
November	 2018,	 public	 and	 private	 business	 leaders	 agreed	 to	 scale	 up	
sustainable	 investments,	 especially	 in	 infrastructure.	 The	 call	 to	 action	
identified	7	areas	 for	 follow-up	 that	G20	governments	 can	promote	 through	
regulations	 and	 their	 own	 activities,	 including	 harmonization	 of	 operating	
principles,	 ESG	 disclosures,	 and	 long-term	 sustainability	 policies,	 as	 well	 as	
evidence-based	 risk	 profiles.	 Three	 specific	 action	 areas	 for	 infrastructure	
focus	 on	 use	 of	 public	 financial	 instruments	 to	 shift	 risk,	 preparation	 of	
bankable	projects,	and	creation	of	country	platforms.	
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The	experience	of	the	initial	implementation	of	the	ODA	private	sector	window,	
as	laid	out	in	the	IDA	18	mid-term	review,	provides	some	salutary	lessons	about	
the	difficulties	 that	are	 likely	 to	be	encountered.	There	are	 several	windows	
that	 have	 been	 created	 to	 facilitate	 greater	 private	 sector	 financing	 in	 low	
income	countries.	While	off	to	a	solid	start,	it	seems	that	the	blended	finance	
facility	 and	 local	 currency	 facility	 have	 the	 most	 rapid	 uptakes,	 while	 risk	
mitigation	is	more	complex	and	requires	greater	project	preparation	lead	time.	
Small	and	medium	enterprise	financing	and	agribusiness	have	been	dynamic	
sectors.	The	early	experience	also	suggests	that	private	financing	in	low	income	
countries	and	fragile	states	is	feasible	(International	Development	Association,	
2018).	 Healthy	mobilization	 ratios	 (total	 cost	 of	 investment	 per	 unit	 of	 IDA	
resources)	of	8:1	have	been	realized.	
The	 G20	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	 deepen	 the	 agenda	 and	 monitor	 its	
implementation.	One	important	quantitative	metric	is	the	degree	to	which	long-
term	 institutional	 capital	 from	 G20	 countries	 is	 flowing	 into	 SDG	 related	
investments.	For	example,	the	EU	has	an	action	plan	to	reorient	capital	flows	to	
sustainable	 investment,	 to	 manage	 financial	 risks	 from	 environmental	 and	
social	 causes,	 and	 to	 foster	 transparency	 and	 long-termism	 in	 financial	 and	
economic	activity.	
The	Japan	G20	Leaders’	meeting	can	serve	to:	
• Reinforce	Leaders’	support	to	the	timely	implementation	and	follow-up	
to	the	Eminent	Persons	Group	report;	
• Identify	and	share	good	experiences	with	expanding	sustainable	finance,	
especially	by	large	institutional	investors	and	national	and	international	
development	banks	in	G20	member	countries;	
• Encourage	 other	 international	 financial	 institutions	 to	 study	 the	 IDA	
experience	 to	 determine	 if	 they	 too	 can	 facilitate	 greater	 volumes	 of	
private	financial	flows	to	developing	countries,	including	to	low	income	
countries	and	fragile	states;	
• Pursue	 actions	 to	 shape	 and	 invigorate	 social	 impact	 investing	 and	
sustainable	 financing	 investment	 vehicles	 to	 build	momentum	 around	
private	financing	for	social	good;	
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• Review	 and	monitor	 the	 growth	 in	 sustainable	 private	 financing	 from	
each	of	their	countries.	
Measures	to	improve	the	allocation	of	development	finance	
There	is	a	major	unresolved	dilemma	in	the	allocation	of	development	finance.	
On	the	one	hand,	the	estimates	of	financing	needs	are	very	large	(hence,	“from	
billions	 to	 trillions”).	Some	countries	 face	particular	 issues,	 in	particular	 low	
income	countries,	fragile	states	and	selected	Least	Developed	Countries	(LDCs).	
For	example,	there	are	12	LDCs	that	will	graduate	from	this	group	in	the	next	
few	 years	with	 consequent	 loss	 of	 duty-free,	 quota-free	 preferential	market	
access	 and	 aid	 for	 trade	 under	 the	 WTO	 window.	 They	 may	 need	 special	
attention	 for	 financing	 to	 manage	 the	 current	 account	 deficits	 during	 this	
transition.	
Another	allocation	issue	is	to	match	finance	with	sectoral	needs.	As	a	matter	of	
practice,	most	infrastructure	financing	would	be	debt	rather	than	equity.	For	
infrastructure	 financing,	 where	 the	 volumes	 are	 largest,	 debt	 would	 often	
exceed	80	percent	of	total	project	costs.	The	problem,	of	course,	is	that	from	a	
macro	point	of	view,	many	developing	countries	cannot	afford	to	take	on	too	
much	debt	too	quickly—their	absorptive	capacity	is	limited.	The	default	is	to	
continue	with	 the	 current	 approach	 that	 gives	 pre-eminence	 to	macro	 debt	
considerations	over	micro	assessments	of	the	returns	to	capital.	
One	proposal	is	to	try	to	shift	financing	towards	more	equity.	This	would	relieve	
some	of	 the	debt	pressures	but	creates	problems	with	affordability.	Because	
equity	is	far	more	expensive	than	debt	financing,	infrastructure	services	would	
need	to	be	priced	higher,	thereby	reducing	accessibility.	
A	balance	is	needed	between	macro,	micro	and	affordability/access	concerns	
that	should	be	based	on	detailed	country	considerations.	Rules-of-thumb	are	
not	good	proxies	in	these	debates.	The	costs	of	erring	on	the	side	of	too	much	
caution	can	be	very	high	 in	 terms	of	 foregone	opportunities	 for	accelerating	
SDG	 related	 investments.	Against	 that,	 the	 costs	 of	 erring	 on	 the	 side	 of	 too	
much	debt	can	also	be	high	if	this	precipitates	a	crisis.	
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G20	members	are	the	principal	providers	of	international	development	finance,	
but	they	do	not	hold	similar	views	on	how	to	strike	the	best	balance.	Efforts	to	
forge	a	consensus	on	the	various	economic	and	political	issues	are	unlikely	to	
prevail;	but	there	can	be	progress	on	the	overall	ecosystem.	The	G20	can:	
• Assist	in	generating	a	more	comprehensive	international	debt	registry.	If	
each	 G20	 country	 requested	 (and	 then	 published	 in	 aggregate	 form)	
information	 from	 its	own	 financial	 firms	on	 the	extent	of	 cross-border	
flows	of	debt	 going	 to	 governments	 and	public	 agencies	 in	developing	
countries,	it	would	be	a	common	basis	on	which	all	creditors	could	make	
judgments	as	to	country	creditworthiness.		
• Reinforce	 the	 emphasis	 on	 improving	 governance	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	
Although	imperfectly	measured,	existing	metrics	of	governance	are	the	
most	 significant	 determinant	 of	 creditworthiness	 of	 developing	
countries.	All	G20	members	have	an	interest	in	helping	countries	if	they	
choose	to	improve	institutions	that	support	the	rule	of	law.	
• Support	developing	countries	in	the	creation	of	sector-specific	platforms	
to	 generate	 coherent	 and	 high-quality	 project	 proposals,	 linked	 to	
national	 development	 plans,	 with	 capacity	 for	 troubleshooting	 on	
implementation,	harmonization	of	procedures	and	pooling	of	finance	and	
risk	mitigation	instruments.	Such	platforms	could	be	used	by	MDBs	and	
UN	agencies	to	pool	their	funds	in	pursuing	common	goals.	
• Encourage	international	institutions	to	do	more	with	the	private	sector,	
and	 encourage	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 be	 more	 responsive	 to	 public	
concerns	such	as	ESG	reporting.	For	example,	the	Multilateral	Investment	
Guarantee	Agency	(MIGA)	has	only	paid	out	10	claims	since	its	inception	
in	1988,	because	it	has	been	proactive	in	resolving	disputes.	MIGA	has	a	
plan	for	growth,	but,	with	a	level	around	$5	billion	per	year	in	guarantees,	
it	 is	 too	 small	 to	 have	 a	 transformative	 impact	 on	 international	
development	 finance.	 MIGA’s	 country	 and	 project	 size	 limits	 could	 be	
expanded	with	support	from	its	G20	shareholders.	
Measures	to	fund	global	functions	
Although	there	is	much	talk	about	the	funding	of	global	public	goods,	this	term	
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is	too	narrow	when	taken	literally	as	an	economic	concept,	and	often	too	broad	
when	 used	 expansively	 for	 any	 global	 action.	 Across	 a	 range	 of	 sectors,	
however,	there	is	a	strong	case	for	international	collective	action	to	fund	non-
rival	 and	 non-excludable	 functions,	 like	 research	 and	 knowledge	 sharing,	
functions	with	significant	potential	spill-overs	such	as	control	of	pandemics	and	
mitigation	of	global	warming,	and	global	norm	setting,	visioning,	convening	and	
advocacy	on	policies,	 such	as	FAO’s	principles	 for	 responsible	 investment	 in	
food	 and	 agriculture	 (Yamey	 et	 al.	 2018).	 Importantly,	 the	 latter	 includes	
funding	 of	 participants	 from	 the	 Global	 South	 in	 norm	 setting	 to	 ensure	
inclusive	agency.	
Aid	replenishments	
A	 number	 of	 important	 international	 agencies	 are	 starting	 negotiations	 to	
replenish	 their	 funds	 in	 2019	 and	 2020.	 Typically,	 these	 negotiations	 are	
handled	on	a	case-by-case	basis;	each	agency,	often	using	an	external	facilitator,	
makes	its	case	independently	of	others	to	each	of	the	donors	on	the	basis	of	a	
program	of	work	that	details	the	results	the	agency	hopes	to	achieve.		
In	 2019/2020,	 however,	 the	 sheer	 number	 of	 agencies	 and	 the	 volume	 of	
replenishments	 suggests	 that	 an	 approach	 based	 on	 a	 set	 of	 core	 principles	
would	 be	 useful.	 The	 replenishments	 involved	 are:	 the	 Global	 Fund	 (6th),	
African	Development	Fund-15,	 IDA-19,	GAVI	(3rd),	Asian	Development	Fund-
13,	 Green	 Climate	 Fund,	 the	 Global	 Partnership	 for	 Education	 (4th)	 and	 the	
International	Fund	for	Agricultural	Development-12.	In	addition,	there	are	calls	
for	additional	funding	of	the	Global	Agriculture	and	Food	Security	Program	and	
for	launching	the	International	Financial	Facility	for	Education.		
The	 funds	 fall	 into	two	categories:	multisector	 funds,	 focused	on	the	poorest	
countries	(IDA	and	regional	bank	funds);	and	vertical	funds	focused	on	health,	
education,	climate	and	food	security.	
In	the	last	cycle,	these	funds	required	about	$65	billion,	sufficient	to	support	
new	spending	of	about	twice	that	amount	(the	higher	number	for	new	spending	
is	because	some	funds	are	now	able	to	borrow	in	capital	markets	to	on-lend	to	
countries,	and	significant	repayments	are	falling	due	on	past	credits).		
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Many	of	these	funds	face	the	same	sets	of	issues:	ensuring	additionality	in	the	
face	of	budget	pressures,	especially	at	a	time	when	market	access	is	feasible	for	
many	countries	(and	indeed	for	many	funds);	ensuring	appropriate	 focus	on	
low-income	 and	 lower	middle-income	 countries;	 and	 expanding	 the	 base	 of	
contributors	to	enhance	the	multilateral	characteristic	of	the	funds.		
G20	members	constitute	the	largest	economies	in	the	world,	and	hence	will	be	
the	dominant	contributors	to	these	and	other	potential	funds.	It	would	be	useful	
if	they	approached	the	negotiations	in	a	systematic	way.	They	could	learn	from	
the	experience	of	the	UN	in	its	new	Funding	Compact	which	strives	to	rectify	
the	 imbalance	 between	 stagnant	 core	 contributions	 and	 rising	 non-core,	
voluntary	 contributions	 that	 have	 to	 be	 continuously	 renegotiated.	 One	
approach	is	to	make	more	use	of	 innovative	finance	mechanisms	that	can	be	
more	stable	and	predictable	 than	budget-funded	ODA.	 Interesting	new	 ideas	
include	the	international	finance	facility	for	education	(IFFEd).	
Negotiations	for	replenishments	of	existing	funds	would	be	significantly	helped	
if	G20	members	committed	to:	
• Maintain	commitment	levels	in	national	currencies	in	aggregate	to	these	
9	agencies	at	least	at	the	level	of	the	last	replenishment,	thereby	allowing	
donors	to	reallocate	among	agencies	while	keeping	constant	their	overall	
commitment	to	the	global	agenda;		
• Support	a	minimum	allocation	of	concessional	funds	to	low	income	and	
lower	middle-income	countries	of	75%	(in	grant	equivalent	terms);	
• Develop	 a	 formula	 for	 burden	 sharing	 on	 these	 and	 other	multilateral	
agencies	with	emerging	and	developing	economy	members	of	 the	G20,	
taking	into	account	income	levels	and	size	of	their	economy,	to	be	phased	
in	over	time;	
• Encourage	 balance	 sheet	 optimization	 by	 agencies,	 including	
authorization	 for	 market	 borrowing	 within	 agreed	 upon	 prudential	
limits.	
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